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RESTRICTING HATE SPEECH
AGAINST "PRIVATE FIGURES":
LESSONS IN POWER-BASED
CENSORSHIP FROM DEFAMATION LAW

by Victor C. Romero*
I. THE PROBLEM: THE GROWING,
SEAMLESS WEB OF HATE
Last fall, the quiet town of Carlisle, Pennsylvania was the
scene of a Ku Klux Klan (Klan) rally.! Although the Klan is now but a
shadow of its former self,2 the prospect of a Klan rally in the
*
Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School
of Law. E-mail: <VCR1@PSU.EDU>. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference in
February 2001. Thanks to Marina Angel, David Brennen, Jim Gilchrist, Phoebe
Haddon, Christine Jones, Charles Pouncy, Carla Pratt, and Frank Valdes for
their thoughtful comments which have greatly improved this piece; Matt
Hughson, Gwenn McCollum, and Raphael Sanchez for their expert research
assistance; and most of all, my wife, Corie, and my son, Ryan, as well as my
family in the Philippines for their constant love and support of this and many
other projects. All errors that remain are mine alone.
1.
See David Blymire, Officials: Klan Disappointed, Sentinel (Cumberland,
Penn.), Sept. 24, 2000, at Al ("With hoods covering their faces, 22 robed members
of the Ku Klux Klan rallied on the steps of Cumberland County Courthouse in
Carlisle in front of a maximum crowd of 350 people Saturday."); Elizabeth Gibson
& Joe Elias, Community Unites Against Hate; Ridge Joins Thousands at
Celebration That Counters KKK Rally in Carlisle, Sunday Patriot-News
(Harrisburg), Sept. 24, 2000, at A01, 2000 WL 9362227.
2.
"The Ku-Klux-Klan, upon which President Johnson has declared war, is
no longer the powerful, monolithic group of the 1920s, whose membership ran in
the millions and whose political influence in the south was total. There are now a
number of splinter organizations competing for legitimacy." On This Day, March
29, 1965: Last-Ditch Struggles of the Ku-lux-Klan, Times (London), Mar. 29,
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community galvanized residents to respond. While not many relished
the fact that the Klan's right to rally was protected by the First
Amendment's freedoms of speech and assembly,3 in the end, the
community's own exercise of its free speech and assembly rights
appeared to sufficiently blunt any message the Klan had for it that
day. In addition to a counter-demonstration at the rally site, many
Carlisleans helped stage a 'Unity Rally" at a separate location to
celebrate the values of diversity and community.' Those opposing the
Klan were also aided by "time, place and manner" restrictions
limiting the Klan to a specific location for a fixed time period.'
Finally, a local ordinance permitted the borough of Carlisle to not
only seek reimbursement from the Klan for, among other things, the

1996, at 21. Various KKK groups have been further weakened by litigation
efforts, most notably by the Southern Poverty Law Center. See, e.g., Carolina
Klan Loses Suit Over Church Arson, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 31, 1998, at A9; $37.8M
Verdict In Church Burning, Newsday, Jul. 25, 1998, at A13. See also The Year in
Hate: Race-Based Nationalism, Black as Well as White, is on the Rise as the
Number of American Hate Groups Swells, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr.,
Montgomery, Ala.), Spring 2001, at 34, 35 [hereinafter The Year in Hate]
(The Klan continued a long decline, dropping from 138 groups
in 1999 to 110 in 2000. The most active group, the American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, lost chapters as its leader, Jeff
Berry, faced new criminal charges and lost a civil suit filed by
the Southern Poverty Law Center.).
3.
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble... ."U.S. Const. amend. I.
4.
See Christopher Maier, United We Stand, Dickinson Mag., Winter 2001,
at 13 (describing Unity Celebration). Another positive outgrowth of the Klan rally
was the revitalization of the Carlisle Area Chapter of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which had been dormant for over
thirty years. See Jennifer Vogelsong, Residents Gather to Restart NAACP,
Sentinel (Cumberland, Penn.), Nov. 5, 2000, at B1; Elizabeth Gibson, Carlisle
Pursues NAACP Chapter: Nearly 200 People Sign Petitions Circulated by Unity
Event Organizers,Patriot-News (Harrisburg), Oct. 13, 2000, at B16.
5.
Joe Elias, Carlisle Trying to Ignore KKK Rally, Sunday Patriot-News
(Harrisburg), Sept. 17, 2000, at F02 ("The KKIK asked for two hours for its
protest. The demonstration will be restricted to the steps of the courthouse and
Klan members won't be permitted to parade on the streets or sidewalks."). See
also Heffron v. Intl Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981) (noting that the Supreme Court has often approved reasonable time, place,
and manner content-neutral restrictions on speech); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 924-25 (1997) (describing the
development of the "time, place and manner" doctrine).
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police protection required at the rally, but also to deny any further
rally permits to the Klan should it be unable to foot the bill.6 In sum,
the First Amendment did not allow the Klan to promote its racist
agenda in any manner it saw fit. Certain values of equality and
community in the guise of content-neutral "time, place, and manner"
ordinances allowed the larger public to contain and neutralize the
Klan's hate speech-"expression that
abuses or degrades others on
7
account of their racial.., identity."
However, while effective at combating real-time, physical
manifestations of hate speech in the form of Klan rallies, our current
First Amendment jurisprudence is ill-equipped to stop the
proliferation of white supremacist websites, 8 which provide
everything from first-person shooter video games in which recruits
can gun down minorities, 9 to music filled with racist invective and
propaganda. 10 Unlike with the Carlisle Klan rally, it is difficult to

6.
See David Blymire, Bill on Way to Klan: Officials Want $18K from KKK,
Sentinel Weekly (Cumberland, Penn.), Oct. 10, 2000, at A4; Joe Elias, Ensuring
KKK its Rights Costs Taxpayers $18,103: Parade Ordinance Lets Carlisle Send
Klan $11,235 Bill, Patriot-News (Harrisburg), Oct. 5, 2000, at B01.
7.
See Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Constitution ix (1996). Like
Professor Heyman, I acknowledge that a broader definition of hate speech can be
used to encompass expression targeting individuals based on their ethnicity,
gender, religion, sexual orientation, or some other characteristic. Id. at lxviii n.4.
I limit my comments here, however, to hate speech based on race.
8.
Although certainly not a scientific survey, I conducted a search of the
term 'white power' on http://www.google.com on January 26, 2001, which
produced "about 24,700" hits. As for hate groups generally, the Intelligence
Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center has identified 602 hate groups in the
United States as of 2000, forty-eight of which it categorizes as Black Separatist.
(The other categories are KKK, Neo-Nazi, Racist Skinhead, Christian Identity,
Neo-Confederate, and Other.). See Active Hate Groups in the United States in the
Year 2000, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Spring
2001, at 36. Interestingly, the Center does not include solely web-based hate
groups because its research suggests that many of these are individuals who like
to portray themselves as powerful organizations. Id.
9.
See Julie Salamon, "Hate.com": The Web as Home for Racism and Hate,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2000, at E8 (review of "Hate.Com" documentary describing
availability of "video games on the Internet where black people are the targets").
See also HBO Center Document Hate on Net, SPLC Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr.,
Montgomery, Ala.), Sept. 2000, at 1 (describing "Hate.Com" documentary).
10.
See Listening In: 'National Socialist Black Metal' Music Isn't Available
in Most Record Stores, But It's on the Net-if It Hasn't Sold Out Already,
Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Fall 2000, at 11; Kate
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apply current "time, place, and manner" restrictions to racist
websites because, among other things, the assumed harm to the
community is less tangible and the speech of the purveyor (without
any accompanying act) more pure, and therefore, more worthy of
protection. Indeed, any content-neutral restrictions aimed at
burdening such communication might be viewed as pretexts for
censorship. As most libertarians and absolutists would contend, to
place content-based restrictions on this web-based speech simply
because we disagree with it would undermine the very foundation of
the First Amendment's commitment to free expression.
Despite these arguments, racist hate speech is like no other.
It is a powerful force, especially when unleashed across the web. My
concern about the proliferation of racist websites parallels the music
industry's concern over Napster." Just as the music industry loses
control over its ability to market its intellectual property because
Napster facilitated the exchange of music for free, white supremacist
websites provide the steady growth of an underground cottage
industry of hate, thereby perpetuating white privilege. The obvious
difference between these two cases is that the music industry asserts
a property right protected through copyright laws which provide

Millar, Internet Racists Find US a Safe Haven, Seminar Told, Agence FrancePresse, Feb. 17, 2000, 2000 WL 2735490 ("[Mlusic featuring racist and violent
lyrics not found in music shops is increasingly carried on the
Internet.. . ."). See also The Year in Hate, supra note 2, at 35 (describing other
methods of outreach by hate groups, including the Internet, concerts, and
mailings). As neo-Nazi National Alliance leader William Pierce explains:
[We have evidence now that there are a lot more people out
there who like us than we may have thought; we know that we

are on the right course by continuing to put most of our efforts
into developing our ability to communicate with the public; and
the hold the Jews [have] on power can be challenged, shaken,

and broken.
Id. (quoting William Pierce).
11.
See, e.g., John Gibeaut, Facing the Music, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 37, 41
("It's perhaps not surprising that some elements of the Internet culture view free
music as a matter of right. Copyright stands in the way of that entitlement.").

More recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against Napster for
abetting copyright infringement. See Matt Richtel, Napster's Clouded Future,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 2001, at Cl. Ironically, Napster's demise has coincided with
the rise of more sophisticated music-swapping websites that are more difficult to
monitor. See Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y.
Times, Jul. 20, 2001, at Al.
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presumed, quantifiable monetary harms for their violation. 12 In
contrast, outside the realm of direct, face-to-face tortious assaults,
courts are reluctant to impose liability upon entities that do little
more than assert opinions, however hateful, that are protected by the
First Amendment. 13 Indeed, some might contend that in capitalist
and multiculturalist America, neither wealthy musical artists nor
people of color have much to fear from upstarts such as Napster or
12.

For example, in copyright claims, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994) provides for

presumed statutory damages as follows, in pertinent part:
(c) Statutory Damages.(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the
copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in
the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more
infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less
than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just. For
the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or
derivative work constitute one work.
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed
willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000 [subject
to certain conditions].
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994).
See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.
13.
Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) ("The problems of bigotry and discrimination
sought to be addressed here are real and truly corrosive of the educational
environment. But freedom of speech is almost absolute in our land and the only
restriction the fighting words doctrine can abide is that based on the fear of
violent reaction.").
Unfortunately, because of the power bestowed upon the First
Amendment, law enforcement officers are sometimes reluctant to police even
direct, face-to-face assaults. In its Spring 2001 report, the Southern Poverty Law
Center described a verbal attack on Bridget Newman, 16, by Jonathan Phelps, a
member of an anti-gay church in Topeka, Kansas. When she complained to the
police, Newman and her mother were told, "Oh, you must be from out of town.
The Phelpses just do these things and there's nothing we can do about it. It's
within their legal rights." Bridget noted, "I turned away crying and really upset.
They had all the rights and I had none." A City Held Hostage: Homosexual-Hater
Fred Phelps' Lawsuits and Heavy-Handed Tactics Have 'Bullied into Submission'
an EntireKansas City, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.),
Spring 2001, at 19, 26 (quoting Bridget Newman).
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the fringe white supremacist, respectively; after all, the latter two
will likely never be able to amass enough power or influence to
seriously affect the former. Does one really think, for instance, that
Madonna's uncanny ability to sell millions of records will be damaged
by Napster? 4 Analogously, how likely is it that America would return
to a de jure racial caste system?
There are, nonetheless, two essential harms wrought by hate
speech that require redress, one direct and one indirect. First,
coming upon a white supremacist website contributes directly to the
insult and humiliation suffered by many people of color on a daily
basis. This is a harm that is well documented in the social psychology
literature and has been cited to at length by such preeminent legal
scholars as Professors Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence III, Mari
Matsuda, and Kimberl6 Crenshaw; thus, it needs only brief mention
here. 5 While it might be difficult for some to imagine the harm
something as ridiculous as a racist website might have on an
intelligent, educated person of color, as Peggy Davis notes, cognitive
psychology is replete with examples of how seemingly minor assaults
on minority psyches or "microaggressions," while perhaps harmless
individually, collectively wreak havoc on the person of color to
reinforce the myth of white superiority and, simultaneously, minority
inferiority. 6 Each hateful message displayed on a white supremacist

14.
Indeed, one might argue that non-Madonna fans might be converted
after sampling some of her music via Napster.
15.
See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words that Wound: Critical Race

Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993) (collection of
seminal hate-speech articles by Professors Matsuda, Delgado, Lawrence, and
Crenshaw); Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 142 (25th Anniversary

ed., 1979) ("One's reputation, whether false or true, cannot be hammered,
hammered, hammered, into one's head without doing something to one's
character."); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2332 (1989) ("In addition to physical

violence, there is the violence of the word. Racist hate messages, threats, slurs,
epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group.").
16.

As Peggy Davis explains:

"These are subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal
exchanges which are 'put downs' of blacks by offenders."
Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view them as
"incessant and cumulative" assaults on black self-esteem.
Microaggressions simultaneously sustain[ ] defensive-

deferential thinking and erode[ I self confidence in
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website aims to put the person of color in her place and reinforces the
current American racial caste system which, consciously or
unconsciously, promotes the idea that nonwhites are inferior to
whites. Decrying society's resistance to censoring racist speech,
Professor Lawrence warns that
it is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of
racism that makes the unregulated marketplace of ideas an
untenable paradigm for those individuals who seek full and
equal personhood for all. The problem is that the idea of the
racial inferiority of non-whites infects, skews, and disables
the operation of the market (like a computer virus, sick

Blacks.... [Bly monopolizing... perception and action
through
regularly
irregular
disruptions,
they
contribute[ ] to relative paralysis of action, planning
and self-esteem. They seem to be the principal
foundation for the verification of Black inferiority for
both whites and Blacks.
The management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity,
simultaneously necessary to and disruptive of black
adaptation.
[The black person's] self-esteem suffers ... because he
is constantly receiving an unpleasant image of himself
from the behavior of others to him. This is the
subjective impact of social discrimination .... It seems
to be an ever-present and unrelieved irritant. Its
influence is not alone due to the fact that it is painful in
its intensity, but also because the individual, in order to
maintain internal balance and to protect himself from
being overwhelmed by it, must initiate restitutive
maneuvers.. .- all quite automatic and unconscious. In
addition to maintaining an internal balance, the
individual must continue to maintain a social facade
and some kind of adaptation to the offending stimuli so
that he can preserve some social effectiveness. All of
this
requires
a
constant
preoccupation,
notwithstanding...
that
these
adaptational
processes ... take place on a low order of awareness.
Vigilance and psychic energy are required not only to marshall
adaptational
techniques,
but
also
to
distinguish
microaggressions from differently motivated actions and to
determine "which of many daily microaggressions one must
undercut."
Peggy C. Davis, Law As Microaggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559, 1565-66 (1989)
(internal citations omitted).

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[33:1

cattle, or diseased wheat). Racism is irrational and often
unconscious. Our belief in the inferiority of non-whites
trumps good ideas that contend
with it in the market, often
17
it.
without our even knowing

The second harm is an indirect one: people of color are
indirectly harmed by the white supremacist website because of its
cost-efficient nature as a propaganda disseminator, leading to the
increased risk that hateful speech might turn into hateful acts.
Despite the best efforts of groups such as the Simon Wiesenthal
Center, the Anti-Defamation League, and Hatewatch that have led to
a softening of the content of many racist websites, the number of
racist websites has actually increased over time. 8 While there has
been only one case linking hate speech website propaganda to actual
violence, 19 there have been several cases in which members of hate
groups who have committed crimes have led to the liability of the
organizations themselves through vicarious liability and agency

17.
Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 468.
18.
Bill Hendrick, Hatred Under Attack, Atlanta J. & Const., Apr. 15, 2000,
at B1, 2000 WL 5452166 ("'As the Internet grows, we can expect this to grow,'
[the Anti-Defamation League's] Kaiman says. The number of hate groups had
started a downward trend until the Internet caught on.'"); The Year in Hate,
supra note 2, at 34-35 ("By using the Internet, hate groups reached out
electronically to a potential audience of millions of people.... [Some] believe the
sites have the insidious effect of cultivating sympathizers even if they do not
swell hate group membership rolls.").
19.
In Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/ Willamette, Inc. v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999), the court entered
judgment on a jury verdict of $107 million in favor of abortion providers who sued
anti-abortion activists based on, among other things, the public disclosure of the
providers' names and addresses and the offer of rewards for the successful
termination of these providers' work. This information was disseminated through
the use of posters and an Internet website called the "Nuremburg Files." See
Steven G. Gey, The Nuremburg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats,
78 Tex. L. Rev. 541 (2000) (discussing the First Amendment issues raised by the
Nuremburg Files litigation, and explaining the error on the part of civil
libertarians in dismissing any free speech claims on behalf of the defendants).
The plaintiffs' victory was short-lived, however. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the activists' posters and website could not reasonably be construed to
be direct threats that either the defendant organizations or their agents would
physically attack the plaintiffs; hence, the posters and website were forms of
protected speech under the First Amendment. Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007
(9th Cir. 2001).
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principles.2 0 To the extent that our tort law allows recovery against
organizations and individuals that had no direct hand in an assault
committed by the groups' members, it would arguably not be much
more of a fiction to recognize a causal link between website hate
speech and crimes committed by race mongers inspired by such
propaganda. In perhaps the most famous domestic terrorist act of
recent memory, Timothy McVeigh, the notorious Oklahoma City
bomber, had direct links to the anti-government and anti-minority
Christian Patriot movement, providing yet another example of the
nexus between hateful speech and violent action. 21 Indeed, outside
the law, the effect of violent speech on one's psyche has welldocumented empirical support. The American Academy of Pediatrics
recently called for a limit on the amount of television children should
watch, citing its findings that media may contribute to short-term
aggressive behavior.2
Aside from the link between hate speech and violent acts,
and the increased risk of more acts because of the proliferation of
racist websites, there is reason to believe that recent changes in the
substantive content of some websites might further exacerbate
matters. Because of the success civil rights groups such as the
Southern Poverty Law Center have had at holding hate

20.
The most recent celebrated case of this sort was the Southern Poverty
Law Center's multimillion-dollar verdict against the Aryan Nations for some of

their members' physical assaults on two Jewish plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sam Howe
Verhovek, Leaders of Aryan Nations Found Negligent in Attack, N.Y. Times, Sept.
8, 2000, at A24; Attack Victims Buy Aryan Nation Compound, N.Y. Times, Feb.
14, 2001, at A24 ("A mother and son whose [$6.3 million] lawsuit bankrupted the
neo-Nazi Aryan Nations bought the group's 20-acre compound for $250,000 today

and said they planned to sell it, perhaps to a human rights organization.").
21.
See, e.g., Tanya Telfair Sharpe, The Identity Christian Movement:
Ideology of Domestic Terrorism, 30 J. Black Studies 604 (2000).
22.
See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement, Children, Adolescents,
and Television (RE0043), 107 Pediatrics 423-26 (2001) ("This statement describes

the possible negative health effects of television viewing on children and
adolescents, such as violent or aggressive behavior, substance use, sexual
activity, obesity, poor body image, and decreased school performance."), http://
www.aap.org/policy/re0043.html. See also Marilyn Elias, Fight for Quality TV
Moves to Pediatrics, USA Today, Feb. 6, 2001, at D1 ("In a hard-hitting new
policy, the [American Academy of Pediatrics] called on doctors to create local
coalitions that would promote widespread 'media education' for youngsters and

protest violent and sex-drenched programming.").
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organizations responsible for the acts of their members, 23 racist
organizations have abandoned using their websites as cost-effective
recruiting tools. 24 Despite the convenience and economy of posting
membership applications on their websites, racist organizations fear
that if more join as members and then engage in violent acts, the
organizations themselves could then be held vicariously liable. Many
racist websites advocate 'lone wolf actions by their visitors; they do
not ask website visitors to join the organization, but do encourage
them to perpetrate crimes against minorities as 'lone wolves' or
single operators. 25 By encouraging violent acts without soliciting
membership from the perpetrators, web-based racist organizations
hope to avoid liability while continuing to spread the gospel of hate.
But what is the solution? Like Professor Matsuda, I advocate
the censorship of hate speech that satisfies three criteria: "(1) The
message is of racial inferiority; (2) The message is directed against a
historically oppressed group; and (3) The message is persecutorial,

23.
See, e.g., Editorial, A Jury in Idaho Puts Matt Hale on Notice, Peoria J.
Star, Sept. 15, 2000, at A04 ("'[The recent multimillion dollar Aryan Nations
verdict] sends a warning to hate group leaders that they better be careful when
inciting their followers to violence,' said Mark Potok, editor of the Southern
Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Report."); Martha Irvine, Victim Suing
Supremacist in Shooting, Associated Press, Apr. 4, 2000, 2000 WL 17836609 ("A
black pastor who was wounded in a shooting rampage is suing white supremacist
Matt Hale and his World Church of the Creator in an attempt to hold Hale
responsible for the acts of one of his followers."); Proponent of Silence May Have
Talked Too Much, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.),
Spring 2001, at 2 (reporting that Alex Curtis, a 25-year-old Californian who runs
the racist E-zine, Nationalist Observer, "has long lectured other white
supremacists on the benefits of 'lone wolf violent resistance. Don't keep
membership lists, don't go to rallies or meetings where you can be observed, and,
should you decide to break the law, be sure not to tell anyone about it.").
24.
See Cyberhate Revisited: A Long-time Monitor of Hate Sites on the
Internet Argues that They are Less Important to Extremists than is Commonly
Believed, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Spring 2001,
at 44, 45 ("The far more important way kids get into this [extremist] movement is
through music.... That's why [Neo-Nazi National Alliance leader] William
Pierce bought Resistance Records [America's leading distributor of racist
music].").
25.
See Lakshmi Chaudry, Hate Sites Bad Recruiting Tools, Wired News
On-Line, May 23, 2000 ("The sites instead are beginning to promote 'lone wolf or
'lone shooter' activism, which encourages individuals to go out and act on their
own."), http'/www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,36478,00.html.
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hateful, and degrading." 26 But unlike Professor Matsuda and other
critical race theorists who have artfully articulated various reasons
for why hate speech should be censored, I rely on the First
Amendment defamation doctrine known as the 'public/private figure'
distinction, which acknowledges the difference in power that hurtful
speech has depending on the status of the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court defines 'public figures' as those who have a more prominent
societal role and have greater access to the media than 'private
figures,' which justifies a greater burden on the former to prove that
defamatory statements made against them are actionable. Utilizing
this framework, I contend that white supremacist websites operate to
perpetuate the privilege of whiteness, thereby continuing to help
white 'public figures' at the expense of 'private figures,' nonwhite
groups whose speech, even if equally offensive, deserves to be heard
because of the lesser power they have in society. More specifically,
because whites, like 'public figures,' have a more prominent societal
role and a greater access to the media when compared with
nonwhites, who are more like 'private figures,' the former deserve
less protection than the latter, who are less able to effectively combat
hurtful speech.
The remainder of this Article unfolds in three parts: Part II
briefly examines the debate between those, who like Professor
Matsuda, favor greater protection for minorities vulnerable to hate
speech, and First Amendment absolutists who are skeptical of any
burdens on pure speech. Part III provides another perspective on the
above debate by highlighting the 'public/private figure' distinction as
an area within First Amendment law that acknowledges differences
in power, a construct anti-hate speech advocates should use to
further their cause. Specifically, this section places the 'public/private
figure' division in a theoretical and historical context, and then
provides empirical support 27 for the thesis that whites enjoy a more
'prominent societal role' and greater 'access to media' than
nonwhites. Part IV applies the 'public/private figure' analogy to the
context of websites, arguing that white supremacist websites should
be censored while anti-majority ones should not.

26.

Matsuda, supra note 15, at 2357.

27.
I thank my research assistant, Matt Hughson, for conceiving of this
method of analysis and for finding the data in support of my thesis.
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II. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER HATE SPEECH:
EQUALITY V. INDIVIDUALITY
The current debate over the content-based censorship of hate
speech pits two important core values against each other: equality
against individuality.28
Those favoring greater censorship of hate speech beyond
time, place, and manner restrictions assert that the Equal Protection
values embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment require that
individuals who harm less powerful minorities by perpetuating white
supremacist notions through their speech are not privileged to do
so.' As social psychologists" and critical race scholars3 1 have argued,

28.
For two wonderful surveys of the leading articles and cases in this area,
see Heyman, supra note 7, and Juan F. Perea et al., Race and Races ch. 10 (2000).
29.
While the Supreme Court ruled a hate speech code facially invalid in the
landmark case R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), it has upheld statutes
enhancing sentences of bias-motivated criminals (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
476 (1993)) and recently, it denied certiorari in a case in which a middle schooler
was disciplined for drawing a Confederate flag, without the administration
having proven that he harbored racially-motivated intent. West v. Derby Unified
School Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 71
(2000). Thus, even within the context of First Amendment claims, the Court will
allow notions of community to prevail over individual rights to express oneself.
30.
See generally Allport, supra note 15 (providing a scholarly social science
approach to understanding racial prejudice); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Changes in the Expression and Assessment of Racial Prejudice, in
Opening Doors: Perspective on Race Relations in Contemporary America 119
(Harry J. Knopke et al. eds., 1991) (focusing on racial attitudes of white
Americans, and concluding that while white Americans are becoming "less
prejudiced and more egalitarian," negative feelings toward nonwhites persist);
Vetta L. Sanders Thompson, Perceptionsof Race and Race Relations Which Affect
African American Identification, 21 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1502 (1991)
(reporting results of a study on variables impacting racial identification and
determining that "perceived experiences of racism have an important impact on
each parameter of racial identification"); Howard Schuman et al., Racial
Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 193-95 (1985) (tracing changes
in attitudes toward principles of equal treatment). These and other interesting
psychological studies are examined in Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The
Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 627.
31.
See generally Matsuda et al., supra note 15 (presenting articles by four
critical race scholars on the First Amendment and noting the impact of racist
speech); Davis, supra note 16 (discussing the microaggressions suffered by
African-Americans and the resultant effects on self-esteem); Jody Armour,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice
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racism harms by denying nonwhites their full citizenship not only
through direct verbal assault, but also by reinforcing the false notion
of white superiority. In addition, these commentators also have noted
that, aside from the fact that current First Amendment jurisprudence allows for content-based regulation of speech in areas such
and
as child pornography,32 obscenity,3 3 "fighting words,"'
defamation," many other industrialized nations have enacted antihate speech legislation, not the least of which is our northern
neighbor, Canada.36 Indeed, Professor Delgado and Jean Stefancic
Habit, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 733 (1995) (suggesting that colorblind formalism in courts
may promote unconscious discrimination); John A. Powell, As Justice
Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful Speech in a Democratic Society,
16 Law & Ineq. 97 (1998) (stating that the harm of racist language lies in its
ability to suggest an individual or a group's "place" within society).
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding anti-child
32.
pornography statute against First Amendment challenge).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene
33.
material is not protected by the First Amendment).
34.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(upholding conviction on ground that "fighting words" are not protected under
First Amendment). But see Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words
Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129 (1993) (arguing
for the overruling of Chaplinsky).
35.
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36.
See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Must We Defend Nazis? 63
(1997)
([Olver the past century the courts have carved out or tolerated
dozens of "exceptions" to free speech. These exceptions include
speech used to form a criminal conspiracy or an ordinary
contract; speech that disseminates an official secret; speech
that defames or libels someone; speech that is obscene; speech
that creates a hostile workplace; speech that violates a
trademark or plagiarizes another's words; speech that creates
an immediately harmful impact or is tantamount to shouting
fire in a crowded theater; "patently offensive" speech directed
at captive audiences or broadcast on the airwaves; speech that
constitutes "fighting words"; speech that disrespects a judge,
teacher, military officer, or other authority figure; speech used
to defraud a consumer; words used to fix prices; words ("stick
'em up--hand over the money") used to communicate a
criminal threat; and untruthful or irrelevant speech given
under oath or during a trial.).
In reviewing other countries' experiences, Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. points
out that Canada's enforcement of its censorship provisions has resulted in the

14

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[33:1

concluded that the current First Amendment law is moving away
from free speech absolutism to the recognition of discrete areas
appropriate for censorship. 37 A lot has happened to the First
Amendment since 1997 that calls this thesis into doubt, especially
with the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale,u which arguably expanded First Amendment group
associational and expressive rights, and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,"
which arguably curtailed them." In addition, the 2000-01 term saw
the Supreme Court uphold free speech claims in three different
contexts while granting certiorari in several other cases to be argued
in 2001-02,41 making a new prediction on a possible trend premature.
Irrespective of what the Court does, critical theorists have made a
strong case for why hate speech should be censored by emphasizing

targeting of minority voices, gays, lesbians, and even the prominent black
feminist scholar bell hooks. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil
Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil Rights, New Republic, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at
37, 44.
37.
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 36, at ix
(This book brings good news: the First Amendment's liberation
is at hand. The law of free speech is finally modernizing itself,
finally taking in nuance, context sensitivity, and consideration
of competing values. Passing into history are the days when
stale mottos-"the rule of law is otherwise! you lose"foreclosed consideration of any and all claims for speech
limitation.).
38.
530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that New Jersey anti-discrimination law
forcing Boy Scouts to employ gay scoutmaster violated organization's free
association rights under the First Amendment).
39.
529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding local ordinance requiring nude dancers
to wear g-strings as constitutionally permissible burden on dancers' free
expression rights under First Amendment).
40.
Significantly, in the hate speech context, the Court denied certiorari in a
case in which a middle schooler was disciplined for drawing a Confederate flag,
without the administration having proven that he harbored racially motivated
intent. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 71 (2000).
41.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Overview: A Supreme Court Term to
Remember, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 9, 15 (noting that "free speech claims often
succeed[ed]" during the 2000-01 term and citing three cases from the term);
Subject Index, 3 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 178 (Nov. 19, 2001) (listing four new
cases in the First Amendment area that were to be argued before the Supreme
Court during October through December 2001).
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the importance of sustaining and affirming the dignity of those most
often targeted by such invective-people of color.
In response, First Amendment advocates argue that free
speech rights actually protect both the white supremacist and his
intended victim by allowing the latter redress through the exercise of
her own anti-racist speech. Both within42 and outside the legal
academy, commentators have decried the culture of victimhood they
believe is perpetuated through the creation of hate speech-based
claims. After all, the freedoms of speech and assembly were used
during the civil rights movement in the 1960s to secure rights for
minorities. For people of color to abandon their commitment to the
constitutional amendment that allowed for their greater societal
liberation appears shortsighted." Moreover, Justice Holmes was
skeptical of any irreversible harm to be caused by new ideas borne of
free speech: "If in the long run [these] beliefs ... are destined to be
accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way."45 As Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. summed up the
libertarian position: "Freedom of speech is indivisible; unless we
protect it for all, we will have it for none."46

42.
See, e.g., Stephen Carter, Reflections of An Affirmative Action Baby 177
(1992); Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress:
Lessons for the Post-Brown Era, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 865, 898 (1993).
43.
See Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on
Campus 228-29 (1991) (arguing that affirmative action at universities
perpetuates close-mindedness and intolerance by projecting whites as guilty of
racism, and minority beneficiaries of affirmative action as victims); Gates, supra
note 36, at 37 (suggesting that restricting hate speech as a means of protecting
civil liberties only redirects the issue of racial inequity while failing to find a real
solution to the socioeconomic gap between blacks and whites in America).
44.
See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L.J. 484, 567 ("Only strong principles of free speech
and association could-and did-protect the drive for desegregation."). See
generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 4, 6 (1966)
(focusing on the impact of the civil rights movement on the First Amendment).
45.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46.
Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First
Amendment, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 428, 432 (1967). See also Lee C. Bollinger, The
Tolerant Society 57 (1986) (stating that the paradox of protecting the harmful
speech of those who seek to destroy the values of free speech is one of many
arguments why the libertarian position is incredulous); Lee C. Bollinger, The
Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 979-80 (1990)
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While both the First and Fourteenth Amendments should
theoretically co-exist peacefully, the two sides' preference of one over
the other stems from a fundamental disagreement over the power
that speech wields in American society. Those who believe in
censoring hate speech contend that absolute free speech rights
perpetuate white supremacy because the status quo privileges some
speech over others. Thus, some commentators place little stock in the
speech of the powerless. As Professor Lawrence has noted:
Most blacks-unlike many white civil libertarians-do not
have faith in free speech as the most important vehicle for
liberation. The first amendment coexisted with slavery, and
we still are not sure it will protect us to the same extent
that it protects whites ....

We are aware that the struggle

for racial equality has relied heavily on the persuasion of
peaceful protest protected by the first amendment, but...
they disrupt business as usual and require the selfinterested attention of those persons in power. 47
Professor Delgado adds that
racist speech, by placing all the credibility with the
dominant group, strengthen[s] the dominant story [and]
also works to disempower minority groups by crippling the
effectiveness of their speech in rebuttal. This situation
makes free speech a powerful asset to the dominant group,
but a much less helpful one to subordinate groups-a result
at odds, certainly, with marketplace theories of the First
Amendment. 4
In contrast, free speech advocates dispute this, contending
that all speech is created equal and will be listened to in the
marketplace of ideas. Only if all speech is free will the truth prevail,
they argue. As Justice Holmes stated in Abrams v. United States:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and

(stating the view that harms caused by speech are more similar to harms caused
by nonspeech than is commonly thought).
47.

Lawrence, supra note 17, at 466-67.

48.

Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 36, at 67-68.

20011

RESTRICTING HATE SPEECH

that truth is the only 4ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out.
The next section presents an argument to support the
egalitarian's claim (and rebut the absolutist's) that some speech is
more powerful than others by relying on the traditional First
Amendment distinction between 'public' and 'private' figures in
defamation law. Because of their 'prominent societal role' and 'access
to media,' so-called 'public figures' must bear more defamatory
speech than 'private figures.' This distinction supports the
egalitarian theory that if the speech of minorities is less powerful
than that of whites, then whites should bear the burden of hurtful
speech because they are more likely to be protected by the First
Amendment than similarly situated nonwhites.
III. ANOTHER VIEW: LESSONS FROM THE
'PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE' DIVISION
A.

Group Libel Laws: The Traditional Role Defamation Has
Played in the Hate Speech Debate

References to defamation law in the debate between
egalitarians and libertarians over hate speech usually begin and end
with citations to Beauharnaisv. Illinois, which upheld a state statute
criminalizing statements that defamed groups on the basis of "race,
color, creed or religion."" Egalitarians extol group libel laws as
shining examples of communitarianism,5 ' concerned less with rabid
over-censorship than with society's failure to address the issue of
racist behavior. 2 In contrast, libertarians question the wisdom (and
49.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
50.
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
51.
See Note, A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel Laws, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 682 (1988).
52.
As one commentator noted:
All things taken together, it is hard to believe that we would
lose our character as a constitutional democracy if a number of
cities and towns suddenly took a harder line on the matter of
racial and religious defamation, or if a policeman, say, in
Chicago, moved a shade too quickly one day and took an antiNegro speaker off a public corner. One has the sense, somehow,
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egalitarians acknowledge the possible invalidityu) of Beauharnais
specifically and the enterprise of group libel generally. Justice
Douglas labeled the case "a misfit in our constitutional system " ' for
its allegedly unwarranted restraint on free speech.
Indeed, Professor Hadley Arkes, himself a supporter of the
egalitarian position, concedes that, post-Beauharnais,the Supreme
Court has limited the scope of defamation law by abridging plaintiffs'
rights of recovery. Specifically, Professor Arkes notes that the Court's
decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan' and its progeny have made
it increasingly difficult for 'public officials' and 'public figures' to
recover under libel unless they can show that the injurious
statements were made with 'actual malice'-with knowledge or
reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement, a most demanding
standard. 6 He concludes, therefore, that "[iut has become vastly
harder now to win a libel suit,"57 implying that group libel suits are
even worse candidates for success than individual claims. Because of
this generally held belief among both egalitarians and libertarians
that defamation law offers no modern insights following

that we can survive occasional errors of that sort without
impairing the basic character of this regime or absorbing flaws
that reach to the level of principle. Or at least, one might say,
we could survive those mistakes more easily than we could
survive the consequences of making no judgments at all, or
professing no recognition or any standards by which one could
ever hope to judge.
Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 281, 333.
53.
See, e.g., id. at 287 (noting that "the status of Beauharnais is a live
question"); Note, supra note 51, at 682-83 ("Although the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of [Beauharnais], like provisions have since been subjected
to continuing judicial and scholarly criticism.
").
54.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
55.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56.
Arkes, supra note 52, at 286-87. In contrast, 'private figures' need only
meet the higher standard where they are involved in a matter of 'public concern';
otherwise, their lesser prominence and access to media generally provide them a
lesser standard of proof. See infra Part III.B (discussing 'public/private figure'
distinction and citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
57.
Arkes, supra note 52, at 287.
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Beauharnais'semasculation, it is no wonder that the contemporary
hate speech debate rarely mentions libel law.u
Nonetheless, there is another way of viewing the
'public/private figure' distinction in post-Beauharnaisdefamation law
that might aid egalitarians like Professor Arkes and would support
critical race theorists' claims of the imbalance in power between
majority and minority speech. As the next section details, implicit in
the 'public/private figure' distinction is the acknowledgment that the
speech of a 'public figure' is more powerful than that of a 'private
figure' because of the former's prominent social role and greater
access to media. Thus, the Supreme Court requires the 'public figure'
to first speak himself, absent a showing of 'actual malice'; such a
burden does not rest on the shoulders of the 'private figure.' This
dichotomy supports the egalitarian view that people of color, like
'private figures,' are more susceptible to harmful speech than their
majority counterparts, who, like 'public figures,' have greater access
to channels of speech and are more likely to be heard and accepted
because of it.
Part B sets forth the 'public/private figure' model by applying
it to the hate speech context and supports this theory by examining
the struggle between majority/minority speech in American legal
history. This part concludes by examining contemporary empirical
evidence to support the theoretical and historical claims.
B.

Lessons From The 'Public/Private Figure' Distinction in
Defamation Law: A Theoretical, Historical, and Empirical
Analysis
1.

The Theory: 'Public/Private Figures' and
'Majority/Minority' Dynamics

From a theoretical perspective, much can be learned from the
'public/private figure' distinction in defamation law. By examining
the 'public/private figure' division, we might shift our attention away
from the speech rights of the individual website owner to the likely
harm suffered by the targets of the speech.

58.
For example, Professors Delgado and Stefancic's 200-plus page book on
hate speech devotes just three pages to the subject. See Delgado & Stefancic,
supra note 36, at 218 (index entry for "defamation" cites pages 16, 67, and 98).
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To fully understand the 'public figure/private figure'
distinction, we must first briefly examine the Supreme Court's
decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan,5 9 Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts,60 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.61 This trio formed the
foundation of modern constitutional defamation law by delineating
the 'public/private figure' divide. Prior to 1964, individual states
could freely set their standards for defamation law without fear of
constitutional challenge.62 In New York Times, the Court held that a
public official who claimed defamation on the basis of allegations
that he engaged in racist acts could prevail only upon a showing of
'actual malice'-to wit, that the defendant newspaper printed the
story either knowing it to be false or acting in reckless disregard of
the statement's falsity.6 The Court reasoned that the occasional
erroneous statement was inevitable in a free and robust debate, and
that while a public official should not be libel-proof, the 'actual
malice' standard achieved a fair balance between free speech and
tortious injury.6 To allow common law suits by public officials on the
less stringent grounds of negligence would lead to self-censorship by
newspapers whose very purpose is to encourage open discourse.6
Three years later, the Court grappled with the question of
whether a high standard of proof applied to more than just 'public
officials.' In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, a state university's
athletic director sued to recover over newspaper allegations that he
had conspired to fix a college football game. 66 A plurality of the Court
concluded that a high burden should be placed on the 'public figure'
plaintiff, stating that one who is a 'public figure' may only recover
damages upon "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of

59.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

60.

388 U.S. 130 (1967).

418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61.
62.
See, e.g., Dan Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1121 (2000) ("Since 1964, the
structure of the common law defamation case has been radically altered by
constitutional rulings based upon defendants' rights to free speech.").
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
63.
Id. at 271-72.
64.

65.

Id. at 279.

66.

388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." 7
While concurring in the result, Chief Justice Warren differed
with the plurality, writing that he would have required 'public
figures' to show 'actual malice,' the same standard applied to 'public
officials' in New York Times and one arguably more stringent than
the plurality's. Warren offered three reasons for his heightened test:
first, public figures have as much influence on public issues and
events as public officials do; second, like public officials, public
figures play a significant role in ordering society because, as a class,
public figures have the same access to media as public officials, both
for the purpose of influencing policy and responding to critique; and
third, the general public has as legitimate and substantial an
interest in public figures as it does in public officials.'
The last case in the trilogy, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
followed Warren's reasoning by adopting the 'actual malice' standard
for 'public figures' and for some matters of 'public concern. ' Thus, a
lawyer accused of being a "Communist-fronter" and a criminal, 0
while not a 'public figure' under these facts, was required to either
prove actual damages or meet the actual malice standard to recover
in defamation because the matter was one of 'public concern.'7' More
importantly, Gertz also identified two criteria to determine whether a
person is a 'public' or 'private' figure: first, a 'public figure' generally
has a greater access to the media to rebut any libelous statements
through her own self-help free speech than does the 'private figure.'72
Secondly, a 'public figure' usually has achieved societal prominence
by thrusting herself into the limelight in order to resolve pressing
public issues of importance." Public figures have, in this sense,
assumed the risk of criticism by virtue of their stature in the
community.
In Gertz, we hear the Court echo Chief Justice Warren's
Curtis concurrence that the first remedy against injurious speech is
67.

Id. at 155.

68.
69.

Id. at 162-64.
418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).

70.
71.

Id. at 326.
Id. at 351-52.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.

72.
73.
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the self-help response of more speech, which sounds much like the
libertarian position in the hate speech debate. However, the Court's
decision to draw an explicit distinction between public and private
figures hints at an underlying egalitarian concept: that self-help may
not be as effective for private figures who have achieved less societal
prominence and have less access to media. The 'public/private figure'
distinction, therefore, undergirds the free speech self-help remedy
with a dose of egalitarianism.
Aside from the recognized imbalance in the power of public
versus private figure speech, Gertz also implies that private figures
deserve greater protection from defamation law than public figures.
Although originally conceived as a method of determining the
constitutional burden of proof required by a defamation plaintiff, the
'publicprivate figure' dichotomy also implicitly acknowledges that
those 'public figures' who have achieved societal prominence and
have greater access to media are less likely to suffer net harm than
'private figures' because the former can avail themselves of a
presumably effective self-help remedy by speaking out against the
defamer. 74 Because 'public figures' generally seek out attention, both
good and bad, and because their notoriety often affords them
immediate access to redress through the media, the law assumes
that they need less protection from false and defamatory speech than
the 'private figure,' the average person in society. Thus, the
Hollywood actress often must grin and bear the untruths published
about her unless she can prove 'actual malice,' while the same
negligent speech directed at the 'soccer mom' next door would be
actionable defamation in most jurisdictions. Does this mean that the
'soccer mom' will necessarily suffer more reputational harm than the
Hollywood actress? No, but the law presumes that to be the case
because unlike the actress, the 'soccer mom' has no publicist or
spokesperson to immediately compose a press release to counter the
allegedly defamatory statement.
Both of these implicit truths about 'private figures'-that
their speech is less powerful and that they need greater protection
from libel-can assist us with the problem of censoring 'white power'
websites. Purveyors of 'white power' propaganda are themselves

74.

See id. at 344-45 (noting that 'public figures' usually have "thrust

themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence

the resolution of the issues involved," and therefore, "they invite attention and
comment").
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members of the white majority, which, because of its greater societal
prominence and access to the media, both historically and
contemporarily, are arguably like the 'public figures' of defamation
law. In contrast, people of color and minority website owners that put
forth anti-white propaganda are like 'private figures' because, as a
group, they enjoy less societal prominence and access to media when
compared with their white counterparts.
Using this analogy between 'public figures' and 'the white
majority,' on the one hand, and 'private figures' and 'the nonwhite
minority,' on the other, creates a strong case for censoring antiminority web speech by white supremacists but not anti-white web
speech by black separatists. White supremacist websites perpetuate
notions of race privilege enjoyed by European-Americans in the
United States, the 'public figures,' to the detriment of people of color,
'the private figures.' If one of the underlying goals of the
'public/private' figure distinction is to offer more protection to 'private
figures,' then censoring the free speech rights of white supremacists
would arguably be permissible under this interpretation of this First
Amendment construct.
In contrast, black separatist websites that injure 'the white
majority' through equally harmful speech should be allowed to exist
for two reasons: first, if black separatists are members of the 'private
figure' group of persons of color, under the Gertz analysis, it is likely
that their speech will not carry as much power as the same speech
uttered by white supremacists, who are members of the 'public figure'
group. And second, the targets of the anti-majority speech are
themselves 'public figures' who, by virtue of their greater societal
prominence and access to media, have an effective self-help remedy
by putting forth their own speech.
2.

Historical and Contemporary Support for the
'Public/Private Figure' Prongs of 'Prominent
Societal Role' and 'Access to Media'

One might contend that the 'public/private figure' model
described above is flawed because it permits the proliferation of some
kinds of racist speech. Put differently, the 'public/private figure'
distinction arguably should be used to censor any speech that
discriminates on the basis of race. Thus, any anti-white or 'black
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power' 75 websites should also be censored alongside the white
supremacist ones to the extent that they, too, perpetuate the idea of
racial discrimination.
At one level, this criticism has merit: both anti-white and
anti-minority websites spew racial hatred and put down others on
the basis of their race; both groups could therefore be considered
'public figures' under this argument because they perpetuate the
dominant narrative that race matters, rather than promoting the
ideal of colorblindness. However, looking more closely at the
underlying rationales for the 'public/private figure' distinction, the
history underlying American race relations, and contemporary
empirical evidence, it becomes clear that white power groups are part
of a larger 'white societal majority' that more closely fits the 'public
figure' characterization.
a.

Like Public Figures, Whites Have Achieved
Societal Prominence By Establishing and
Perpetuating White Privilege

While many whites would not want to be associated with
'white power' groups, all whites enjoy certain power, privilege, and
prestige by virtue of their race that make them akin to 'public
figures.' First, by establishing the dominant narrative that
presupposes and perpetuates white supremacy and privilege, the
white majority has achieved 'societal prominence' by thrusting 'itself
into the public limelight, much like public figures in defamation law
have done. By excluding many other racial voices from the discourse
for so long, the white majority has taken center stage in defining race
relations in America, and so should be willing to 'assume the risk' of
being at the forefront of that discourse.
Briefly surveying American history, whites have time and
again dictated racial order in the United States. From slavery7 6 to the

75.
This example is illustrative, not exclusive. My analysis would, therefore,
apply to other nonwhite-owned websites that printed anti-white messages, but I
am not aware of any, whereas 'black power' websites do in fact exist.
76.
Starting with the constitutional compromise that allowed for the
preservation of slavery in the United States (see U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, § 9,
cl. 1, and art. IV, § 2, cls. 1, 3), black slaves were regarded as little more than
property (see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)), and hence, had no
formal method to challenge their oppression. Instead, they had to rely on methods
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Asian Exclusion Laws 77 to the more recent backlash against
affirmative action,78 the dominant narrative of white privilege has
been maintained and nurtured by a white majority unwilling to
relinquish power. Like the Hollywood star whose celebrity allows her
to command a $20 million per picture salary, the white majority has
created a society in which its power is institutionally ensconced, and
thus, it (like the movie star) should accept any criticisms of its
'performance' as a way of accepting responsibility for the 'lead role' it
has decided to undertake. And while many whites-the poor and
disabled, for instance-have also been excluded from the dominant
discourse, they have nonetheless benefited from the privileges that
their whiteness affords them. These less powerful are akin to the
'involuntary' public figures of defamation law: 79 while they have not
been able to influence the public discourse in the way their more
powerful white brethren have, they nonetheless benefit from the
privileges their whiteness secures. In contrast, minority voices have
been almost completely silenced by the overwhelming power
(whether intentionally or unintentionally) of the white voice, and
should therefore, like 'private figures,' be afforded more protection
of self-help (e.g., the Underground Railroad and slave uprisings) or on the work of
white abolitionists.
77.
Upheld by the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889), the Chinese Exclusion Act forbade Chinese nationals from
entering the United States. The Court deferred to Congress's assessment that the
Chinese were "unassimilable" and left unchecked, would invade and overrun
white America. Other laws limited immigration and naturalization to whites
only, and were commonly upheld by the Supreme Court. See generally Ian F.
Haney-Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996) (exploring
the social and legal origins of white racial identity and tracing the reasoning of
courts in justifying whiteness).
78.
"Affirmative action-the practice of considering race as a factor in
university admissions-is currently under attack in Michigan and Florida, and it
has been beaten down in Washington, Texas, and California in recent years."
Victor C. Romero, Racial Profiling: "Driving While Mexican" and Affirmative
Action, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 195, 199-200 (2000). The assault against affirmative
action has not been led exclusively by the majority; many prominent AfricanAmericans believe it is in the best interests of that group to dismantle such
policies. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn't
Enough, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 58-59 (1999) (noting Stephen Carter, Justice
Clarence Thomas, Shelby Steele, and Ward Connerly as among the prominent
blacks who oppose affirmative action).
79.
See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 62, at 1177 ("[Clourts have recognized public
figure status in some cases even when the defamation plaintiff did not inject
herself into public issues and also when no controversy was involved.").
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when they speak, even when they use language that also expresses
hatred of the white power structure.
Aside from the theoretical and historical bases for white
privilege, contemporary empirical evidence supports the idea that,
like 'public figures,' the white majority has achieved more 'societal
prominence' than people of color when tested against several
measures-numerosity, economic power, representation in corporate
America, educational achievement, and representation in elected and
appointed office. Although the demography of the United States is
changing, 80 whites were projected to comprise 82.2% of the American
populace per the November 2000 U.S. Census Bureau statistics; in
contrast, blacks were projected to comprise 12.8%; American Indian,
Eskimos, and Aleuts, 0.9%; and Asian and Pacific Islanders, 4.1%,
respectively. 81 Measured by economic wealth, non-Hispanic white

80.
As reported in The Economist, the predicted demographic diminution of
white majority power from 1950 to 2050 is dramatic indeed:
In the 1950 census, America was 89% white and 10% black.
Other races hardly got a look in. Now Latinos account for
around 12% of the population. Within the next five years, they
will overtake blacks to become the largest minority group. If
current trends continue, they will be the majority in Los
Angeles County in ten years. In 20 years, they will dominate
Texas and California. By 2050, one in four of the 400 [million]
people who will then be living in the United States will be
Latino-and if you add in Asians, their joint share will be one
in three.
Oh, Say, Can You See?, Economist, Mar. 11, 2000, at 63. Even still, by 2050,
whites will still account for roughly two-thirds of the American population, given
these projections.
81.
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Resident Population
Estimates of the United States by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: April 1, 1990
to July 1, 1999, with Short-Term Projection to November 1, 2000, available at
http'//www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile3-1.txt (last visited Nov.
17, 2001). Hispanics of any race are predicted to comprise 11.9% of the population
in November 2000. Id.
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Americans are one of only two groups whose three-year (1997-99)
average median household income exceeds the national mean.82
Disparities between whites and nonwhites exist in the areas
of employment and education as well. Among its many findings, the
Federal Glass Ceiling Commission reported in 1995 that 97% of
senior managers of Fortune 1000 Industrial and Fortune 500
companies were white; for Fortune 2000 Industrial and Service
companies, black men with a professional degree earned 21% less
than white men with the same degree in the same job category;
finally, only 0.4% of managers were Hispanic.n At all collegiate and
graduate levels, more whites have earned educational degrees than
either blacks or Hispanics.'

82.
The other is the "Asian and Pacific Islander" group. The three year
(1997-99) average median household income by race statistics are as follows:
1. All races-39,657
2. White (Non-Hispanic)--$43,287
3. Black-$26,608
4. American Indian/Alaska Native-$30,784
5. Asian/Pacific Islander-$48,614
6. Hispanic-$29,110
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Income of Households by Race and
Hispanic Origin Using 1997-1999 3-Year-Average Medians, Income 1999, Table
B, http'//www.census.gov/hhes/income/income99/99tableb.html (last visited Nov.
17, 2001).
83.
Fed. Glass Ceiling Comm'n, A Solid Investment: Making Full Use of the
Nation's Human Capital, Recommendations of the Glass Ceiling Commission
(Final Report) 9 (Nov. 1995) (describing the realities of glass ceiling barriers in
corporate America), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edul/library/earchive/
gov-reports/GlassCeiling/default.html?page=documents.
84.
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Highest Degree Earned,
by Sex, Race, Hispanic Origin and Age: Spring 1993, http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/education/p70-51/table0l.txt (last visited Oct. 17, 2001). The
statistics (numbers in thousands) are as follows:
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Finally, it is worth noting that whites are far better
represented among both elected and appointed officials. Citing a
1992 survey by the U.S. Census, the Population Reference Bureau
notes:
The 106th Congress includes among its 535 voting
members 37 African Americans, 18 Hispanics, and three
Asians and Pacific Islanders in the U.S. House of
Representatives; and two Asians and Pacific Islanders and
one American Indian in the U.S. Senate.... [In addition,]
less than 5 percent of local elected officials were black,
Hispanic, Asian, or American Indian. African Americans
were 3 percent of all local elected officials, Hispanics were 1
percent, American Indians and Alaska Natives were 0.4
percent, and Asians and Pacific Islanders were only 0.1
percent of all elected local officials.

1. Doctorate
a. White-1,105

b. Black-48
c. Hispanic-24
2. Professional
a. White-1,956
b. Black-60
c. Hispanic-101
3. Masters

a. White-7,454
b. Black-523
c. Hispanic-294
4. Bachelors
a. White-21,746
b. Black-1,683
c. Hispanic-948
5. Associates
a. White-7,236
b. Black-759
c. Hispanic-488
Id.
85.
Kelvin M. Pollard and William P. O'Hare, America's Racial and Ethnic
Minorities: Political Participation,54 Population Bull., Sept. 1999, at 40-42.
More specifically, the racial make-up of the 106th Congress is as follows:
1. Total members-535 (435 H.R., 100 Senate)
2. Black-37 (6.91%) (37 H.R., 0 Senate)
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And, as is common knowledge, not one of the United States'
43 Presidents, 47 Vice-Presidents, or 16 Supreme Court Chief
Justices has been a person of color.
Thus, from a theoretical, historical, and empirical
perspective, a strong argument can be made to equate 'public figures'
with the white majority in American society because they have
achieved more societal prominence than their nonwhite counterparts.
b.

Like 'Public Figures,' Whites Have Greater Access
to Media than Nonwhites

In addition, defamation law teaches that 'public figures'
typically have greater access to media than their 'private figure'
counterparts. This access provides them with the opportunity to
mitigate their harms by speaking out against their alleged defamers.
This second prong acknowledges that the speech of public figures is
more effective and powerful than that of private figures. Thus, the
'access to media' idea acknowledges that, even within our First
Amendment jurisprudence, not all speech is created equal, contrary
to absolutists' assertions. Indeed, just as the white majority has
voluntarily (or consciously) and involuntarily (or unconsciously)
thrust itself into (and hence benefited from) the dominant racial
narrative, it has also enjoyed greater access to the media than
minorities. This greater access translates into more powerful speech
for the white majority-speech that will more likely be heard,
understood, and accepted by society than that of the racial minority.
Aside from the aforementioned dominance exerted by the
white majority over the racial discourse in American history,86
empirical evidence supports the proposition that white Americans
typically enjoy greater access to the media and therefore have a
better opportunity for self-help than nonwhites. First, statistics
particularly relevant to the issue of website censorship reveal that
certain minorities have less access to computers and the Internet,
and therefore may be less able to use that media to refute hate
speech directed against them. As of 1997, while 78% of all schools
3. Hispanic-18 (3.36%) (18 H.R., 0 Senate)
4. Asian/Pacific Islander-5 (0.9%) (3 H.R., 2 Senate)
5. American Indian-1 (0.2%) (0 H.R., 1 Senate)

Id.
86.

See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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were wired to the Internet, 84% of schools with less than 6% minority
students were wired to the Internet, as compared to 63% for schools
with greater than 50% minority students.87 Outside the classroom,
statistics suggest that while Internet use among blacks is growing,8
the U.S. Commerce Department recently reported that whites and
Asian-Americans are twice as likely as blacks and Hispanics to have
Internet access. 89 In 1998, computer household ownership by race
was as follows: Non-Hispanic whites-46.6%; Hispanic-25.5%; NonHispanic Blacks-23.2%; other Non-Hispanic-50.9%.90 And second,
overall representation of minorities among television and radio
owners is far below their presence in the national population. In
1994, minorities represented almost 23% of the national workforce
but controlled only 2.9% (323) of the 11,128 commercial radio and
television stations on the air; in addition, people of color controlled
only 0.2% (15) of the approximately 7500 cable television operators. 91
Just as a strong argument can be made that the white
majority has achieved 'societal prominence' to satisfy the 'public
figure' definition's first prong, the previous discussion shows that
empirical evidence also supports the claim that like public figures,
the white majority has substantially greater access to media, and
hence a more effective self-help remedy, than nonwhites.

87.
See Steve Rhodes, Classrooms With Class-And Possibly Espresso
Machines, Newsweek, Dec. 14, 1998, at 20 (describing the U.S. Department of
Education's statistics on schools' Internet access).
88.
LeGina Adams, Internet Use on the Rise, Black Enterprise, Mar. 1, 2001,
at 28.

89.

U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital

Inclusion, available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/fallingthoughthenet.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2001). See Bob Jackson, Black, Hispanic Web Access Lags,
Rocky Mtn. News, Mar. 16, 2000, at 61A, 2000 WL 6590300 (citing Commerce
Department's report FallingThrough the Net).

90.
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information
Association, Chart A-10: Percent of U.S. Households with Computers By
Race/Origin 1984-1998 (Selected Years), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
fttn99/AppIII/Chart-A-10.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
91.
Fed. Communications Comm'n, 1994 Statistics, http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/MassMedia/Notices.fcc94323.txt (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
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IV. THE MODEL APPLIED: CENSOR WHITE
POWER, TOLERATE NONWHITE SPEECH
While the empirical evidence generally supports the thesis
that whites should be considered 'public figures' and minorities
'private figures' in terms of their relative prominence in society and
access to media, and that therefore, minorities are entitled to greater
protection against hate speech, how does this analogy support the
censorship of websites? According to one source that tracks racist
websites, there are approximately 244 white supremacist websites
and seven black separatist websites. 92 Just as the white majority has
arguably achieved 'public figure' status in general society, it appears
that 'white supremacist' websites enjoy the same prominence in
cyberspace vis-&-vis minority hate speech websites.
However, to test the theory and the evidence supporting it,
this next section will examine two cases of censorship-one of a white
supremacist website and one of a black power website.
A.

Censoring the White Supremacist Website

When I typed in "www.angelfire.com/sk/naziwhitepower" into
my browser on January 26, 2001, I was immediately sent the
following message: "you are entering Nazi teritory [sic] ... Blacks
keep out!" The backdrop for this message was a page full of
swastikas .93
On the website, "www.stormfront.org," I found the following
description of the infamous Rodney King beating in Los Angeles:
Consider what happened. If, let us say, an Italian had led
the police on a breakneck chase at a hundred miles an hour,
been stopped by a roadblock, and beaten while resisting
arrest, there would have been no cameraman waiting, and
the incident, if reported at all, would have been given five

92.

The 244 are broken down into the following: KKK-97 websites; Racist

Skinhead-19; Neo-Nazi-80; Identity-30; Neo-Confederate--18. There are also
115 "Other" websites, which do not fit into any of the categories described above.
Active Hate Sites on the Internet in the Year 2000, Intelligence Rep. (S. Poverty
Law Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Spring 2001, at 40.
93.
www.angelfire.com/sk/naziwhitepower (last visited Jan. 26, 2001). This
website is no longer available.
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lines on an inner page of the local newspaper. The man
arrested would have been only a White man and no one
would have been interested.
The criminal who tried to escape belonged to the race which
is recognized as superior because the White slaves have to
work hard to support it, encourage its guinea-pig style
breeding, and provide it with Cadillacs and other
necessities of life. He was a black gorilla, so huge that his
wrists were too big for handcuffs, and his hundred-mile an
hour attempt to escape was halted by a roadblock that was
set by directions over short-wave radio that anyone could
hear. The camera-man was waiting, shot his 'footage,' and
the poison-pen press and our enemies' boob-tubes made the
incident a national agitation, at the time and for a year
thereafter while the courts were troubled with litigation
about the incident.
The mayor of the rotting city-a nigger!-was given what
he had long sought, a pretext to force from office the chief of
police in Los Angeles, whose department was one of the
most efficient and relatively honest in the United States,
and to replace him with a nigger, who, you may be sure,
will teach his White subordinates not to interfere with
savages exercising their Civil Rights to hunt White rabbits.
The policemen who had done their duty were persecuted in
the courts and finally acquitted by a jury of White
Americans, so bigoted that they did not know that the
savage pets of the Master Race can do no wrong.94
Applying the 'public/private figure' analysis to these two
examples, both exemplify the hateful, venomous perpetuation of
white supremacy at the expense of minorities. Per Professor
Matsuda's analysis, both examples are messages of racial inferiority
directed against a historically oppressed group which are arguably
persecutory, hateful, and degrading. 95 Controlled by members of the
white majority, these 'public figure' websites uphold the values of
white privilege and superiority that should be silenced to protect the
equal rights of 'private figures' harmed by their racist invective.

94.

Revilo Oliver, Prompt Confirmation, www.stormfront.org (last visited

Oct. 15, 2001).
95.

See supra text accompanying note 26.
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Tolerating the Anti-White Website

A visit to the House of David website, hosted by a so-called
"Black Separatist" group, reveals the following:
The 12 tribes of Israel are those who are the descendants of
both the slaves and indigenous people of the Americas.
Additionally, they are scattered throughout the Caribbean
Islands, and the four corners of the earth. Read
Deuteronomy 28:15-68 and II Esdras 13:40-46.
NATIONALITY, a word often used but frequently
misinterpreted. Many people today view the term
"nationality" as the country (land mass) you are from or the
color of your skin, while others characterize it by what
language you speak. Due to this misconception, it is
necessary to explain the word "Nationality". Nationality,
derives from the word "Nation". When you study the
etymology (the origin) of the word "nation", its Latin root is
Natio which means BIRTH; RACE. So when you are asked
about your nationality, the correct response would be to say
what lineage/race you come from, according to your father.
As we study our history and nationality, we uncover a
mystery hidden for ages. The Blacks (so-called Negroes),
Indians (of Native American descent), and Latinos of Indian
descent etc, are in actuality, all of the same lineage
(NATIONALITY / RACE). According to the Bible, these
people are all descendants of the ancient ISRAELITES.
They are the people that were delivered from the land of
Egypt, the land of their captivity, by the hands of Moses.96
This website uses the Bible to justify its anti-white message,
not unlike the way the Christian Separatist movement uses the same
text to justify its anti-minority message.97 However, the theoretical,

96.
House of David website, http'//www.hodc.com/12tribes.htm#tribes (last
visited Nov. 17, 2001).
97.
Consider the following from the Christian Separatist website:
This passage is from the Apostle Paul's letter to the Galatians
(5:19-21). Let us categorically consider this list of those works
or actions of the flesh that are clearly designated in our Bibles
as unacceptable behavior or those works that are excluded
from the behavior of the just man. 1. Mongrelization.
Translated for moiceia or moicheia, which carries a primary
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historical, and empirical support underlying the 'public/private
figure' distinction suggests that the anti-white message carries less
power than the anti-minority message for at least three reasons:
first, as members of the white majority, the Christian Separatist
group helps promote and perpetuate the message of white privilege
and superiority long established by those majority group members
who have achieved societal prominence by "thrust[ing] themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved."98 While their specific message
of racial separation might not be adhered to by a majority of whites
today,' the Christian Identity member's viewpoint supports the
status quo in which whites sit atop the American racial pyramid. In
contrast, the House of David's speech is a response to, and critique of,
the existing racial order. As Professor Matsuda eloquently states:
While white-hating nationalist expressions are troublesome
both politically and personally, I would interpret an angry,
hateful poem by a person from a historically subjugated
group as a victim's struggle for self-identity in response to
racism. It is tied to the structural domination of another
group. Part of the special harm of racist speech is that it
works in concert with other racist tools to keep victim
groups in an inferior position. Should history change
course, placing former victim groups in a dominant or
equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the
special protection suggested here for expression of
nationalist anger.' °°

meaning of seedline corruption; thus, whether race-mixings or
relationships between persons of the same race. The Biblical

use of the word presupposes the existence of two distinct
seedlines: the pure and unadulterated seedline of the Adamic
family of God's family, later known as Israel, and the existence
of a non-white seedline of impure and therefore unclean beings.

Paul therefore lists as a prohibited behavior of the flesh the
adulteration of any pure seedline or being created in the
original cosmotic world order according to the laws of nature-

as a behavior or action that is an unjust behavior.
V.S. Herrell, The Actions of the Flesh, Christian Separatist, http://www.

christianseparatist.orgBriefs.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2001).
98.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
99.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia
anti-miscegenation statute as unconstitutional).
100. See Matsuda, supra note 15, at 2361-62.
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Second, the power of the white Christian Separatist's
message is multiplied by the prevalence of other Christian Identity
websites (not to mention other white supremacist groups that
advocate anti-miscegenation 1 ); indeed, one source identifies 30
Christian Identity websites, over four times as many as the seven
Black Separatist groups it lists. 01° Thus, it is much more likely that
an Internet visitor would stumble upon the hateful speech of a white
supremacist than a black separatist. The increased probability of
encountering hateful speech in turn raises the likelihood that the
direct and indirect harms to persons of color discussed previously"
might ensue.
And third, as 'public figures' that might be harmed by the
House of David's words, the white majority has many avenues for
redress, from their own access to the Internet or to regular broadcast
media as well as through their representatives in government and
the public sphere."° Weighing the potential harms suffered by the
'public figures' against the speech of these members of the minority
group, the proper balance appears to favor keeping offensive antimajority websites uncensored.
C.

Objections to the 'Public/Private Figure' Model

There are at least three objections that might be raised
against this model.
First, one might object that there is no valid way to
incorporate
my analysis into
existing First Amendment
jurisprudence to provide actual relief for minorities because current
law frowns upon content-based regulation of speech. While it is true
that content-based regulation is typically suspect, the Supreme Court
in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications
Commission"' recognized that such restrictions could pass

101. See, e.g., Alabama White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Q. What Does the
Klan Think About Interracial Marriages?, Official Website, http:ll
www.kukluxklan.netjindexl8.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
102. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
104.

See supra statistics in Part III.B.2.

105.

512 U.S. 622 (1994).

36

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[33:1

16
constitutional muster if they survive strict scrutiny.&
Strict scrutiny,
in turn, requires that the government's regulation be reasonably
necessary to achieve a compelling interest."7 In the context of hate
speech, this has proven a formidable hurdle because the Court has
recognized that while combating racism is an important interest,
regulations that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint generally
violate First Amendment dictates.1 Despite the current orthodoxy, I
offer the 'public/private figure' model if not to ultimately persuade
this Supreme Court, then to point out that current First Amendment
defamation law actually supports egalitarian claims that some
speech is more powerful than others, contrary to the libertarian
position.

A second argument might be that I misuse the 'public/private
figure' model by creating analogies to groups out of a legal construct
intended to apply only to individuals. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
decision to move away from the Beauharnaisgroup libel model to the
constitutional determination of individual claims set forth in New
York Times and its progeny supports this position." While it

106. Id. at 642 ("Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to
regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content.").
107. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) ("The
dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is
reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests ...
108. See id. at 391
(In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even
beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination. Displays containing some words-odious racial
epithets, for example-would be prohibited to proponents of all
views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke race,
color, creed, religion, or gender-aspersions upon a person's
mother, for example-would seemingly be usable ad libitum in
the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.,
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers'
opponents.);
396 ("Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's
front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to
prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.").
109. See, e.g., Arkes, supra note 52, at 287 ("In view of the erosion in the
concept of libel, one must wonder whether the ground has been cut out from
under the decision in Beauharnais. There were some who thought, when the
Times case was decided, that it marked the end of Beauharnais.").
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certainly has been questioned,"' Beauharnais has never been
overruled. In addition, while New York Times and its progeny focus
on individualized determinations of who is and is not a 'public figure,'
that does not render invalid my contention that implicit in the
dichotomy is the assertion that a public figure's speech is more
powerful than a private figure's. What I have done here is no
different from what plaintiffs' lawyers do when filing a class action
lawsuit:"' I have taken an individual characteristic-the difference
in speech power implicit in the 'public/private figure' divide-and
have used it to describe the experiences of whites versus nonwhites
based on a review of historical and contemporary evidence regarding
112
the 'societal prominence' and 'access to media' of the two groups.

110. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th
Cir. 1989)
(The Supreme Court opinion in Beauharnais is generally
regarded as providing some support for group libel claims. The
cases decided since Beauharnais, however, have substantially
undercut this support. To the extent that Beauharnais can be
read as endorsing group libel claims, it has been so weakened
by subsequent cases such as New York Times that the Seventh
Circuit has stated that these cases "had so washed away the
foundations of Beauharnais that it cannot be considered
authoritative.")
(internal citations omitted).
111.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23:

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
I thank Professor Frank Valdes for suggesting this argument.
112. Hence, corollary arguments as to whether Al Sharpton or the white
soccer mom would likely be classified as 'public' or 'private' figures misses the
point. While I acknowledge that the 'public/private figure' dichotomy was
intended as a way to define individual defamation plaintiffs, my use of the
dichotomy is to create a class definition to support my censorship argument.
Thus, any references to individual classifications is a non sequitur.
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Finally, a third argument might question the need to remedy
the direct and indirect harms wrought by hateful Internet speech
because, unlike television, radio or even public rallies, accessing hate
speech on the Internet requires more deliberate action on the part of
the recipient. Thus, despite the proliferation of white supremacist
websites, they are less likely to cause harm than other media. The
Supreme Court raised similar points in the context of Internet
pornography:
Though such material is widely available, users seldom
encounter such content accidentally. "A document's title or
a description of the document will usually appear before the
document itself... and in many cases the user will receive
detailed information about a site's content before he or she
need take the step to access the document. Almost all
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the
content." For that reason, the "odds are slim" that a user
would enter a sexually explicit site by accident. Unlike
communications received by radio or television, "the receipt
of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely
turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and
some ability to read to retrieve
material and thereby to use
1 13
the Internet unattended."

I have also chosen not to discuss the issue of anti-minority remarks
made by other people of color, although I am inclined to agree with Professor
Matsuda's thoughtful analysis. See Matsuda, supra note 15, at 2363-64
(What of hateful racist and anti-Semitic speech by nonwhites?
The phenomena of one subordinated group inflicting racist
speech upon another subordinated group is a persistent and
touchy problem. Similarly, members of a subordinated group
sometimes direct racist language at their own group. The
victim's privilege becomes problematic when it is used by one
subordinated person to lash out at another. While I have
argued here for tolerance of hateful speech that comes from an
experience of oppression, when that speech is used to attack a
subordinated-group member, using language of persecution,
and adopting a rhetoric of racial inferiority, I am inclined to
prohibit such speech.).
Ultimately, the lines between white and nonwhite are easier to define. In
addition, not much is gained by trying to determine which among oppressed
groups has suffered most and is therefore most worthy of assistance.
113. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
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Even if accessing information over the Internet is more
difficult than through other media, thereby mitigating any direct
harms to the recipient, the indirect harm through the perpetuation of
hateful, racist ideologies would still exist. In addition, unlike in the
Internet pornography context where one goal is to directly protect the
underage recipient from receiving such material,"' the censorship of
white supremacist websites aims to indirectly protect persons of color
5
who might be harmed by the viewers themselves."
V. CONCLUSION
The success of the 'public/private figure' model as a means for
censoring hate speech depends on one's faith in an institutionally
racist legal system employing the analogy correctly. As Professor
Lawrence acknowledges, the danger with framing the hate speech
debate as one of expressive liberty versus racial equality is that, in
the current environment, "we [may] have advanced the cause of
racial oppression and placed the bigot on the moral high ground,
fanning the rising flames of racism.""' In a country in which my
'public/private figure' argument will most likely be enforced by
institutions infused with unconscious racism, it might be more likely
that minorities expressing anti-majority viewpoints will be censored
more often than white supremacists." 7 And even if I could present
empirical evidence of the disproportionate effect hate speech has on
minorities when compared with whites, there is no guarantee that I
could persuade many, since statistics are sometimes seen as
reflecting the biases of their proponents.11 However, anti-hate speech

114.

Id. at 849 ("At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions

enacted to protect minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' communications

on the Internet.").
115. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
116. Lawrence, supra note 17, at 436.
117. Professor Gates notes, for instance, that in the year that the University
of Michigan enforced its hate speech code, more than twenty claims of violating
the code were brought against blacks by whites for violating the code, while no
claims were brought against a single white person. See Gates, supra note 36, at

37.
118. See, e.g., David A. Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming
Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 237, 252-57

(2001) (arguing that the statistics he has gathered detailing racial profiling by
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advocates who are attracted to my thesis should be clear about its
premise: the 'public/private figure' analysis is not grounded in a
desire to censor based on the skin color of the speaker, rather it
acknowledges the power differential that exists between certain
forms of speech and others, a power differential that, in America, is
based on skin color.'19

police departments have been met with skepticism); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987)
(At most, the Baldus study [which detailed the disproportionate effects of the death penalty on black people]
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race.
Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system. The discrepancy indicated by the
Baldus study is "a far cry from the major systemic defects
identified in Furman.")
(internal citations omitted).
119. Indeed, in an ideal world, I would prefer that neither anti-majority nor
anti-minority hate speech existed. But to the extent that we live in a selfinterested, individualistic society marked by disparities in socioeconomic and
political power, I offer this modest proposal as a 'second-best' solution for a
'second-best' world.

